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Abstract
The emergence of agricultural biotechnology and the subsequent introduction of genetically
modified organisms (GMOs) into the food system have been among the most controversial issues
surrounding the increasingly scrutinized agri-food system. They have received considerable at-
tention in the economics literature with the main focus being on the optimal regulatory response
to products of biotechnology. This paper builds on the literature on the regulation of products of
biotechnology by placing the analysis of labeling decisions in a multi-country context. Specifi-
cally, the objective of this study is to examine the effect of the strategic interdependence between
countries on their regulatory responses to products of biotechnology. The paper analyzes the
strategic effects of national regulatory decisions on labeling of GM products and identifies the
determinants of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium labeling regimes in a small number of pro-
ducing countries that supply the world market of an agricultural product. Analytical results show
that the Nash equilibrium configuration of labeling regimes in countries that have adopted the
GM technology depends on (i) the distribution of consumer preferences and the level of consumer
aversion to GM products; (ii) the size of the segregation and labeling costs in these countries; (iii)
the relative productive efficiency and the cost effectiveness of the GM technology; (iv) the market
power of the life science companies; and (v) the strength of intellectual property rights in these
countries.
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1.  Introduction 
The emergence of agricultural biotechnology and the subsequent introduction of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into the food system have been among 
the most controversial issues surrounding the increasingly scrutinized agri-food 
system. While agricultural producers have responded to the agronomic benefits 
associated with the producer-oriented, first generation of GM products and have 
been adopting GM crops in increasing numbers (James, 2003), consumers around 
the world have expressed an aversion to food products containing GM 
ingredients. Consumer opposition to GM products varies significantly both 
between and within countries and is founded on health, environmental, ethical 
and/or philosophical concerns about agricultural biotechnology (The Economist, 
1999; Giannakas and Fulton, 2002). 
Similarly diverse have been the countries’ regulatory responses to GMOs 
with the issue of labeling being a focal point in policy forums around the world. 
For instance, while the United States (US) opposes the labeling of GM products 
arguing the “substantial equivalence” between the current, producer-oriented GM 
products and their conventional counterparts, the European Union has introduced 
mandatory labeling of GM products on the basis of its “precautionary principle” 
and the expressed consumer aversion to these products (see Sheldon (2004) for a 
comprehensive review of the policy debate between the EU and the US on the 
regulation of GMOs. On the labeling of GM products see also Caswell (1998), 
Runge and Jackson (2000), Crespi and Marette (2003), Fulton and Giannakas 
(2004), and Lapan and Moschini (2004)).   
Consumer opposition to GM products (or its lack thereof) is often cited as 
the primary force behind countries’ decisions on the labeling of these products. 
While consumer reaction is certainly important, there are other factors that are 
also significant in shaping the regulatory responses to products of biotechnology. 
In particular, given the high volume of trade of agricultural and food products and 
the intense competition between the major suppliers for access in the world 
market, a country’s decision on its labeling regime can be expected to affect and 
be affected by the regulatory and labeling regimes of the other major suppliers of 
the product(s) in question. Interestingly, this strategic interdependence between 
the major producers of agri-food products has, to our knowledge, been ignored by 
the relevant literature.  
The objective of this paper is to examine the effect of the strategic 
interdependence between countries on their regulatory responses to products of 
biotechnology. In particular, the paper analyzes the strategic effects of national 
regulatory decisions on labeling of GM products and identifies the determinants 
of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium labeling regimes in a small number of 
producing countries that supply the world market of an agricultural product.  
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When compared to previous research, this study relates more closely to the 
work by Fulton and Giannakas (2004) that analyzes the market and welfare 
effects of the introduction of GM technology under different regulatory and 
labeling regimes. Specifically, our analysis of producer and consumer behavior 
utilizes the methodological framework developed in Fulton and Giannakas 
(2004). Unlike Fulton and Giannakas (2004), however, our study explicitly 
accounts for the strategic interactions among countries by placing the labeling 
decision in a multi-country context. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
methodology and assumptions employed in our analysis. Sections 3 and 4 
examine the producer and consumer decisions under alternative labeling regimes. 
Section 5 derives the equilibrium conditions in the world market under different 
scenarios on the labeling policies of the GM producing countries. Section 6 
derives the payoff matrix of the game and identifies the conditions that facilitate 
alternative Nash equilibria in labeling strategies. Section 7 summarizes and 
concludes the paper.  
2.  Methodology and Assumptions 
Our stylized model considers three producing regions that supply the world 
market of a product. Two of these regions (termed hereafter as “Countries 1 and 
2” or “Players 1 and 2”), have adopted the GM technology and seek to determine 
their labeling regime (i.e., whether to label their GM and conventional produce or 
not). The third producing region represents the rest of the producing regions in the 
world (termed hereafter as “rest of the world” or “R.O.W.”). To concentrate on 
the labeling decisions of countries that have adopted the GM technology, we 
assume that the R.O.W. has not adopted the new technology and supplies the 
world market with non-labeled conventional products.   
As mentioned previously, the focus of our analysis is on the strategic 
interdependence between Countries 1 and 2 and its effect on the formulation of 
their labeling strategies.1 This strategic interaction is modeled as a strategic game 
where the two GM producing countries determine their labeling regimes non-
cooperatively. In particular, Countries 1 and 2 decide on whether to label their 
GM and conventional products or not independently but aware that their labeling 
strategies affect each other’s payoffs. The objective of each GM producing region 
is to determine the labeling regime that maximizes the economic welfare of its 
                                                 
1 Note that, while labeling has been the controversial focal point in the discussions on the 
regulation of products of biotechnology, it is certainly not the only factor affecting the 
development of global markets for GM crops and products. While not the focus of this paper, 
protection of intellectual property and the costs of regulatory approval are also endogenous to the 
various governments and can affect the market potential of agricultural biotechnology.   
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producers. Since all regions export their produce to the world market, maximizing 
producer welfare is equivalent to maximizing total economic surplus in these 
countries.  
Note that, in addition to facilitating the analysis of the GM producing 
countries’ strategic interaction in the world market, the assumption that the GM 
producing countries export their produce to the world market captures the large 
producing countries’ reliance on global demand conditions. As will be shown 
later in the paper, while this assumption enhances the tractability of our analysis 
considerably, it does not affect the qualitative nature of our results.  
Once the regulatory regimes have been determined, farmers in each 
producing region decide on which crop to grow and consumers make their 
purchasing decisions observing the types and prices of products supplied to the 
world market. Our analysis assumes fixed proportions between the farm output 
and the final consumer product.2 To retain tractability, all processing and 
marketing costs other than segregation costs associated with a mandatory labeling 
regime are normalized to zero.  
It is important to note that the labeling decision of a country affects the 
nature of its produce as well as the nature of products supplied to the world 
market. For instance, while the adoption of mandatory labeling results in the 
creation of two separate supply channels for GM and conventional products, the 
absence of a labeling requirement results in the GM and conventional products 
being marketed together as a non-labeled good. Table 1 shows the nature of the 
products supplied to the world market under the different combinations of 
labeling strategies of Countries 1 and 2.   
As shown in Table 1, four distinct scenarios emerge:  
Scenario 1:  Countries 1 and 2 label their produce and two separate supply 
channels for GM and conventional products emerge. Note that, since 
all GM products are required to be labeled as such, non-labeled 
products supplied by the R.O.W. will be (correctly) perceived by 
consumers as being conventional (non-GM).  
Scenario 2:  No country labels its products. GM and conventional products are 
marketed together as a non-labeled good. Since GM products are 
credence goods (Darby and Karni, 1973), consumers cannot observe 
the (GM or conventional) nature of the product supplied.  
                                                 
2 By assuming fixed proportions we implicitly assume that the GM technology does not change 
the technical relationship between the farm output and the final consumer product under concern. 
As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, if the GM variety provided an advantage in pest 
resistance, storability or other post harvest losses, then there would be a systematic violation of the 
assumption of fixed proportions between the farm outputs and the final consumer product. The 
obvious reason is that, in such a case, there will be more final consumer product for a unit of farm 
output when this is GM relative to when it is conventional.  
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Scenario 3:  Country 2 adopts mandatory labeling, while Country 1 does not label 
its products. Under this scenario, there are three products supplied to 
the market: the GM-labeled product, the non-labeled product, and 
the conventional-labeled product.  
Scenario 4:  Country 1 adopts mandatory labeling, while Country 2 does not label 
its products. The products supplied in this case are the same as those 
under Scenario 3.   
 
TABLE 1.  Products supplied under different labeling regimes 
Country 2  
Labeling No Labeling 
 
Labeling 
Scenario 1 
GM-labeled product, 
Conventional (labeled and 
non-labeled) product 
Scenario 4 
GM-labeled product, 
Conventional-labeled 
product, 
Non-labeled product 
Country 1  
No 
Labeling 
Scenario 3 
GM-labeled product, 
Conventional-labeled 
product, 
Non-labeled product 
Scenario 2 
Non-labeled product 
 
 
As mentioned previously, the objective of each GM producing country is to 
determine the labeling regime that maximizes its domestic producer welfare. For a 
Nash equilibrium in labeling strategies to exist, the equilibrium labeling strategy 
of each country should be the best response to the other country’s equilibrium 
labeling strategy. Put in a different way, a profile of labeling strategies is a Nash 
equilibrium, when no country has incentives to deviate, i.e., no country can 
enhance the welfare of its producers by changing its labeling policy. In this 
context, to evaluate the plausibility of the different scenarios in constituting a 
Nash equilibrium, we need to determine the welfare of each country’s producers 
for each of the four scenarios identified above.  
Note that, in each scenario, different actors pursuing different objectives are 
making different decisions. For instance, producers in each GM supplying country 
decide whether to grow GM crops or not, while consumers in the world market 
decide whether to buy these products or not. To capture the partial adoption of the 
GM technology in the major producing regions around the world (James, 2003), 
this paper explicitly accounts for producer heterogeneity in terms of the returns 
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they receive from the different crops. Similarly, to capture the diversity in 
consumer attitudes toward the products of biotechnology expressed in survey and 
various stated consumer preference studies around the world, the study explicitly 
accounts for heterogeneous consumer preferences for GM and conventional 
products.  
3.  Production Decisions 
This section analyzes farmer production decisions in the counties that have 
adopted the GM technology under the different scenarios on labeling regimes 
presented in Table 1. The models of producer heterogeneity developed here are 
similar in spirit to the models by Giannakas (2002) and Fulton and Giannakas 
(2004) that analyze production decisions under imperfect enforcement of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs), and different regulatory and labeling regimes 
for products of biotechnology, respectively, in the context of a country that has 
adopted the GM technology.   
3.1  Production Decisions in Countries that Have Adopted the GM Technology  
3.1.1  Mandatory Labeling: Production Decisions in Country i  
As mentioned previously, producers in each producing region are assumed to 
differ in the net returns they receive from the different crops. Let A∈[0, A] denote 
the attribute that differentiates producers. For tractability, producers are assumed 
to be uniformly distributed between 0 and A. Consider a farmer with 
differentiating attribute A  in country i ( { }2,1∈i ), that decides whether to produce 
the GM, the conventional or an alternative crop. Without loss of generality, 
farmers are assumed to produce one unit of output and the maximum per unit net 
returns to the production of the different crops are given by:3  
                                                 
3 Note that, by assuming a unit production, we implicitly translate all differences between farmers 
into differences in the costs of producing the different crops. Similarly, by assuming unit 
production of both the conventional and the GM crop, we translate all benefits from the new 
technology into production cost savings. While such production cost savings have been the focus 
of the producer-oriented, first generation GM products similar to that modeled in this paper, there 
is no reason to believe that adopting the GM technology would leave the yields unaffected. 
Explicitly accounting for (positive or negative) yield effects, however, results in non-linearities 
that make the derivation of an analytical solution impossible (this point is also made in Fulton & 
Giannakas (2004), p.47). Before concluding this note, it should be pointed out that the model can 
also be seen as reflecting production decisions on units of output. In this case, farmers producing 
multiple units of output under variable returns to scale would be “located” at multiple points of the 
[0, A] interval.    
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)( lgmii
S
gm
l
gm wAP +−= απ   If a unit of the GM crop is produced 
)( ltii
S
t
l
t wAP +−= βπ         If a unit of conventional crop is produced 
0=aπ           If a unit of alternative crop is produced 
To save on notation, the net returns to the alternative crop are assumed to be 
constant among producers and equal to zero.4 The parameters SgmP  and 
S
tP  stand 
for the unit farm prices for the GM and conventional crops, respectively, with 
S
gmP <
S
tP  (i.e., the conventional crop receives a premium over the GM crop). The 
parameters lgmiw  and 
l
tiw  denote the base per unit costs associated with the 
production of the GM and conventional crops, respectively, under the labeling 
regime. The base costs of production are common to all producers and encompass 
such things as the cost of seeds and chemicals used, the costs associated with the 
segregation of the two crops under a labeling regime etc. To capture the producer 
orientation of the first generation of GM products and the fact that the majority of 
segregation costs are incurred in the conventional supply channel (Fulton and 
Giannakas, 2004), it is assumed that  ltiw >
l
gmiw .   
The parameters iα  and iβ  are cost enhancement factors associated with the 
production of GM and conventional crops in Country i, respectively. Thus, the 
terms Aiα  and Aiβ  capture the producer heterogeneity in terms of the costs 
associated with the production of the two crops which stems from differences in 
location and quality of the land, education, experience, management skills etc. 
The total costs associated with the unit production of the GM and conventional 
crops for the producer with differentiating attribute A are then given by 
l
gmii wA +α  and ltii wA +β , respectively. 
The partial adoption of GM crops indicates that, despite the producer 
orientation of the first generation of GM products, the new technology has been 
non-drastic in nature (i.e., many producers are still finding it optimal to grow 
conventional crops). To capture the observed coexistence of GM and 
conventional crops, the agronomic parameter iα  is assumed greater than iβ  (see 
below). The difference ii βα −  captures the cost effectiveness of the GM 
technology – the smaller is the difference ii βα − , the more cost effective is the 
GM technology.  
                                                 
4 This assumption is made for simplicity and does not affect the qualitative nature of our results. 
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A farmer’s production decision is determined by the relative returns 
associated with the different crops. Figure 1 graphs lgmπ  and ltπ  and illustrates 
the farmer production decisions when the price and cost parameters are such that 
the GM technology is non-drastic and all crops enjoy positive production shares.  
0
l
gmi
S
gm wP −
l
ti
S
t wP − iα
iβ
l
t
l
gm ππ =
a
l
t ππ =
l
TiA
l
tiA lTiA
l
gmiA lgmiA
π π
A
 
Figure 1:  Production decisions and welfare under mandatory labeling 
 
The farmer with differentiating attribute lgmiA  (determined by the 
intersection of lgmπ  and ltπ ) is indifferent between producing the conventional 
and GM crops – the net returns associated with the production of these crops are 
the same. Farmers located to the left of lgmiA  (i.e. producers with ),0[
l
gmiAA∈ ) 
find it profitable to produce the GM crop. Since producers have been assumed to 
be uniformly distributed within 0 and A, lgmiA  gives the quantity of the GM crop 
produced in Country i . Mathematically, lgmiA   is given by:  
ii
l
ti
S
t
l
gmi
S
gml
gmi
wPwP
A βα −
+−−=  (1)
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Similarly the farmer with differentiating attribute lTiA  is indifferent between 
producing the conventional and the alternative crops. lTiA  is determined by the 
intersection of the ltπ  and aπ  curves in Figure 1, and gives the total quantity of 
the GM and conventional crops supplied by Country i  as:   
i
l
ti
S
tl
Ti
wP
A β
−=  (2)
The quantity of the conventional crop produced by Country i  is then given 
by lTiA -
l
gmiA , or:  
ii
l
ti
S
t
l
gmi
S
gm
i
l
ti
S
tl
ti
wPwPwPA βαβ −
+−−−−=  (3)
Analyzing equations (1)-(3) shows that if lti
S
t
l
gmi
S
gm wPwP −≤−  the 
adoption of the GM technology will be zero (i.e., the GM technology will be 
ineffective), while if ( )( )ltiStiilgmiSgm wPwP −≥− βα  all producers will adopt the 
GM technology (i.e., the GM technology will be drastic). To focus on the 
empirically relevant case of partial adoption of the GM technology (i.e., the case 
in which the GM technology is non-drastic), our analysis assumes that 
( )( )ltiStiilgmiSgmltiSt wPwPwP −<−<− βα .  
Aggregate producer welfare under the labeling regime is given by the area 
underneath the effective net returns curve (shown by the bold kinked line in 
Figure 1) and equals: ( ) ( )
2
l
Ti
l
ti
S
t
l
gmi
l
gmi
S
gml
i
AwPAwP −+−=Π  (4)
3.1.2  No Labeling: Production Decisions in Country i  
Under a no labeling regime, the farm price for GM and conventional crops is the 
same and the net returns function for a producer with differentiating attribute A  
becomes: 
)( nlgmii
S
nl
nl
gm wAP +−= απ   If a unit of GM crop is produced 
)( nltii
S
nl
nl
t wAP +−= βπ         If a unit of conventional crop is produced 
0=aπ           If a unit of alternative crop is produced 
where SnlP  is the farm price when the GM and conventional crops are marketed 
together. The parameters nlgmiw  and 
nl
tiw  are the per unit base costs of producing 
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the GM and conventional crops, respectively, under a no labeling regime. It 
should be noted that the base costs of producing the two crops under no labeling 
are different than those under a labeling regime. An obvious reason for this 
difference is the absence of segregation and labeling costs when the two crops are 
marketed together as a non-labeled good. A second reason is the pricing of the 
new technology by the life science sector which, as shown by Giannakas (2002, 
p.490), depends on the labeling policy of the GM producing country.   
The quantities of the different products supplied under a no labeling regime 
can be derived by setting Snl
S
t
S
gm PPP ==  in equations (1), (2) and (3) i.e., 
ii
nl
gmi
nl
tinl
gmi
ww
A βα −
−=  (5)
ii
nl
gmi
nl
ti
i
nl
ti
S
nlnl
ti
wwwP
A βαβ −
−−−=  (6)
i
nl
ti
S
nlnl
nli
wP
A β
−=  (7)
Figure 2 graphs the net return functions and the quantities of the different 
crops under the no labeling regime. To allow for positive market shares of the two 
crops, we focus on the case where ( )( )nltiSnliinlgmiSnlnltiSnl wPwPwP −<−<− βα . 
Aggregate producer welfare in Country i  under a no labeling regime is given by 
the area underneath the bold kinked curve in Figure 2 and equals: ( ) ( )
2
nl
nli
nl
ti
S
nl
nl
gmi
nl
gmi
S
nlnl
i
AwPAwP −+−=Π  (8)
3.2  Production Decisions in the Rest of the World   
Since, by assumption, the R.O.W. has not adopted the GM technology, the 
production decision of its farmers is reduced to the choice between the 
conventional crop and its alternative. Given that the R.O.W. does not label its 
conventional product, the net returns function for a farmer with differentiating 
attribute A  is given by: 
)( 33 t
S
nlt wAP +−= βπ        If a unit of conventional crop is produced 
0=aπ        If a unit of alternative crop is produced 
Figure 3 depicts the determination of the quantity of non-labeled 
conventional crop supplied by the R.O.W. given by:  
3
3
3 β
t
S
nl
nl
wP
A
−=  (9)
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0
nl
gmi
S
nl wP −
nl
ti
S
nl wP − iα
iβ
nl
t
nl
gm ππ =
a
nl
t ππ =
nl
nliA
nl
tiA nlnliA
nl
gmiA nlgmiA
π π
A
 
Figure 2:  Production decisions and welfare under no labeling 
3t
S
nl wP −
3β
at ππ =
3nlA
π π
A0
 
Figure 3:  Production decisions in the Rest of the World 
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3.3  Determination of the World Supplies 
The total world supply for each product under the different labeling scenarios 
outlined in Table 1 is derived through the summation of the relevant quantities 
supplied by each producing region. In Scenario 1, for instance, two separate 
supply channels for GM and conventional products emerge. Recall that, since all 
GM products are segregated and labeled as such, products supplied by the R.O.W. 
would be correctly perceived by consumers as being conventional (i.e., non-GM). 
In this context, the summation of the GM quantities supplied by Countries 1 and 2 
gives the total supply of the GM product; while the summation of the 
conventional produce supplied by each region gives the total supply of the 
conventional product.5  
The determination of aggregate supplies for the GM and conventional 
products under Scenario 1 is illustrated in Figure 4 where x represents output 
produced. The graphical and mathematical expressions for the total supplies under 
all four scenarios are presented below.  
3.3.1  World Supplies under Scenario 1 (Both countries label their products) 
GM Crop 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 21 1321111 lgmlgmtltltSgmStSgm iwhwdwwicwhbAagaAP +++−+−+++=  (10) 
Conventional Crop 
321
111
t
l
t
l
t
S
gm
S
t
S
t dwcwbwaAaAP ++++=  (11) 
where  ( )313221321 βββββββββ ++=a   
( )31322132 ββββββββ ++=b   
( )31322131 ββββββββ ++=c   
( )31322121 ββββββββ ++=d   
( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]22112211 βαβαβαβα −+−−−=g  ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]221122 βαβαβα −+−−=h  and  ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]221111 βαβαβα −+−−=i .  
                                                 
5 The total quantity of GM product supplied to the world market under Scenario 1 is given by 
( )∑∑ −
+−−==
i ii
l
ti
S
t
l
gmi
S
gm
i
S
gmi
S
gm
wPwP
AA βα
11
11  while the total quantity of conventional product equals 
( ) 3
3
1
1
3
11
ββαβ
nl
t
S
t
i ii
l
ti
S
t
l
gmi
S
gm
i
l
ti
S
tS
nl
i
S
ti
S
t
wPwPwPwP
AAA
−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−−−−=+= ∑∑ . Utilizing Cramer’s rule 
we get the inverse total supplies for the GM and conventional products shown in equations (10) 
and (11). 
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Figure 4:  Determination of total supplies under Scenario 1 
3.3.2  World Supply under Scenario 2 (No country labels its products) 
In the absence of labeling, only one supply channel emerges (see Figure 5). The 
aggregate world supply of the non-labeled product is given by the summation of 
the quantities produced in the three regions as: 6 
321
22
t
nl
t
nl
t
S
nl
S
nl dwcwbwaAP +++=  (12) 
 
 
Figure 5:  Determination of the total supply under Scenario 2 
                                                 
6 The supply of the non-labeled product is kinked because it contains both GM and conventional 
products (see Fulton and Giannakas (2004)).  
P P P P
x x x x
2
3nlS
2
2nlS
2
1nlS
Country 1 Country 2 R.O.W 
2
3
2
2
2
1
2
nlnlnlnl SSSS ++=
1
3tS
1
2tS
1
1gmS 1 2gmS
Country 1 Country 2 
R.O.W 
1
1tS
P
x
P
x
P
x
P
x
P
x
P
x
P
x
1
2
1
1
1
gmgmgm SSS +=
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3.3.3 World Supplies under Scenarios 3 and 4 (One country labels its products) 
In these scenarios, only one of the countries that have adopted the GM technology 
labels its products. When only Country 1(2) labels its products, the quantities of 
GM- and conventional-labeled products supplied by this country correspond to 
the world supplies of these products. The aggregate supply of the non-labeled 
product is then determined by the quantities produced by Country 2(1) and the 
R.O.W. in Scenario 4(3). Specifically, the world supplies under Scenarios 3 and 4 
are: 
GM Crop in Scenario 3 
3
2
3
2
3
2
3 l
gm
S
gm
S
t
S
gm wAAP ++= αβ  (13) 
Non-labeled Crop in Scenario 3 
31
33
t
nl
t
S
nl
S
nl ownwmAP ++=  (14) 
Conventional Crop in Scenario 3 
l
t
S
gm
S
t
S
t wAAP 2
3
2
3
2
3 ++= ββ  (15) 
with  ( )3131 ββββ +=m   ( )313 βββ +=n  and  ( )311 βββ +=o  
GM Crop in Scenario 4 
4
1
4
1
4
1
4 l
gm
S
gm
S
t
S
gm wAAP ++= αβ  (16) 
Non-labeled Crop in Scenario 4 
32
44
t
nl
t
S
nl
S
nl rwqwpAP ++=  (17) 
Conventional Crop in Scenario 4 
l
t
S
gm
S
t
S
t wAAP 1
4
1
4
1
4 ++= ββ  (18) 
with  ( )3232 ββββ +=p   
( )323 βββ +=q  and  
( )322 βββ +=r  
Figure 6 depicts the determination of aggregate supplies under Scenario 4. 
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Figure 6:  Determination of total supplies under Scenario 4 
 
4.  Consumption Decisions and Determination of Total Demands  
This section focuses on consumer purchasing decisions under each of the 
scenarios presented in Table 1. To capture the GM producing countries’ strategic 
interaction in the world market and the effect of global demand conditions on 
their optimal regulatory responses, a unique consuming region encompassing the 
world consumers is considered. The methodological framework utilized in the 
analysis of consumer behavior derives from the models of vertical product 
differentiation developed by Giannakas and Fulton (2002) and Fulton and 
Giannakas (2004). This framework of analysis allows for heterogeneous 
consumer preferences for GM and conventional products.  
4.1  Consumption Decisions under Scenario 1 (Both countries label) 
Let c∈[0, C] be the attribute that differentiates consumers. The value of c differs 
according to consumer capturing the diversity in consumer attitudes towards GM 
and conventional products. For simplicity, consumers are assumed to be 
uniformly distributed between the polar values of c (i.e., 0 and C). Consider a 
consumer with differentiating attribute c. Assuming that this consumer buys one 
P
x
P P
P
P
P ( )414 tt SS =
4
3nlS
4
2nlS
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P
4
1tS
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x
x
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x
x
4
3
4
2
4
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14 Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization Vol. 4 [2006], Article 1
http://www.bepress.com/jafio/vol4/iss1/art1
  
unit of either the GM, the conventional or a substitute product and that this 
purchase represents a small share of his total budget, his utility can be expressed 
as:   
cPUU Dgm
S
gm λ−−= 11    If a unit of GM product is consumed 
µcPUU Dt
S
t −−= 11   If a unit of conventional product is consumed 
ss PUU −=    If a unit of a substitute product is consumed 
where U is a per unit base level of utility associated with the consumption of a 
product and it is common to all consumers. The parameters 1DgmP , 
1D
tP  and sP  
denote the retail prices of the GM, the conventional and the substitute product, 
respectively. The parameters λ  and µ  are positive utility discount factors 
associated with the consumption of the GM and conventional products, 
respectively, so that the terms cλ  and cµ  represent the utility discount from the 
consumption of the GM and conventional products for the consumer with 
differentiating attribute c. To capture the expressed consumer opposition to GM 
products, we assume that µλ >  with the difference µλ −  reflecting the level of 
consumer aversion to GM products. To save on notation, we assume that 
consumers place the same value on the substitute product.7  
A consumer’s purchasing decision is determined by the relative utilities 
associated with the consumption of the different products. Note that, due to their 
vertical product differentiation, for both the GM and conventional products to 
enjoy positive consumer demands, the price of the substitute has to be greater than 
the price of the conventional product which, in turn, has to be greater than the 
price of the GM product. Thus, to allow for both GM and conventional products 
to enjoy positive market shares when Countries 1 and 2 label their products, we 
assume that 11 Dgm
D
ts PPP >> . Figure 7 graphs 1SgmU , 1StU  and sU  and illustrates 
the consumer purchasing decisions for the case in which prices and preference 
parameters are such that all products enjoy positive shares of the market.  
The consumer with differentiating attribute 1gmc  (determined by the 
intersection of 1SgmU  and 
1S
tU ) is indifferent between purchasing the conventional 
product and its GM counterpart – the utility associated with the consumption of 
these products is the same. Consumers located to the left of 1gmc   (i.e., consumers 
with differentiating attribute c∈[0, 1gmc )) prefer the GM product while consumers 
                                                 
7 This assumption is made for simplicity and does not affect the qualitative nature of our results. 
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located to the right of 1gmc  buy either the conventional product (consumers with 
c∈( 1gmc , 1Tc ]) or the substitute product (consumers with c∈( 1Tc , C]).  
0
1D
gmPU −
1D
tPU −
SPU −
U U
11 S
t
S
gm UU = SSt UU =1
λ
µ
1S
gmx
1S
tx
1S
Tx
1
Tc
1
gmc
C
 
Figure 7:  Consumption decisions under Scenario 1 
 
When consumers are uniformly distributed between 0 and C, 1gmc  gives the 
quantity of the GM product consumed in the world market under Scenario 1, 
1S
gmx . Therefore, the demand for the GM product is given by: 
µλ
PP
x
D
gm
D
tS
gm −
−=
11
1  (19) 
The total quantity of GM and conventional products demanded in the world 
market is given by: 
µ
1
1
D
tsS
T
PP
x
−=  (20) 
while, subtracting 1Sgm x  from
1S
T x  gives the total demand for the conventional 
product as: 
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µλ
PP
µ
PPx
D
gm
D
t
D
tsS
t −
−−−=
111
1  (21) 
The inverse consumer demands for the GM and conventional products can then be 
written as: 
111 S
gm
S
ts
D
gm λxµxPP −−=  (22) 
111 S
gm
S
ts
D
t xµxPP µ−−=  (23) 
4.2  Consumption Decisions under Scenario 2 (No country labels its products) 
In this scenario, GM and conventional products are marketed together as a non-
labeled good. Consumers have the choice between the non-labeled product and its 
substitute and the utility function becomes:  ( ) cPUUE DnlSnl φ−−= 22  If a unit of non-labeled product is consumed 
ss PUU −=    If a unit of the substitute product is consumed 
where 2DnlP  is the retail price of the non-labeled product, and φ  is the discount 
factor associated with its consumption. Due to the credence nature of the GM 
product, consumers cannot distinguish between the GM and conventional 
products. Since consumers are uncertain about the nature of the non-labeled 
product, its consumption is associated with an expected utility (Giannakas and 
Fulton, 2002). 
Assuming that consumers have rational expectations, the utility derived 
from the consumption of the non-labeled product is proportional to the global rate 
of adoption of the GM product. The greater is the production share of the GM 
product, ψ, the greater is the perceived probability that the non-labeled product is 
genetically modified, and the lower is the utility associated with its consumption. 
The utility discount factor associated with the consumption of the non-labeled 
product, φ, is given by: 
( ) ( ) µµλψµψψλφ +−=−+= 1  (24) 
where 22 /
S
nl
S
nlgm AA=ψ  with 2 /S nlgmA  being the quantity of GM product supplied 
by all countries that do not label their products, and 2SnlA  being the total quantity 
of the non-labeled product (which includes the non-labeled production by the 
R.O.W.). The parameter ψ  can be rewritten as: 
  
( ) ( )
2
2211
S
nl
nl
gm
nl
t
nl
gm
nl
t
A
wwfwwe −+−=ψ  with ( )111 βα −=e  and ( )221 βα −=f  (25) 
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Figure 8 graphs ( )2SnlUE  and sU  as well as the determination of the 
consumer demand for the non-labeled product, 2Snlx , when 
2D
nls PP > . Formally, 
2S
nlx  is given by:  
( ) µµλψ +−
−=
2
2
D
nlsS
nl
PP
x  (26) 
and its inverse form can be written as: 
( ) 222 SnlSnlsDnl xxPP µψµλ −−−=  (27) 
 
0
2D
nlPU −
SPU −
U U
( ) SSnl UUE =2
φ
2S
nlx 2
nlc
C
 
 
Note that, in the absence of labeling, the global production share of the GM 
product affects the consumer demand – the consumer demand in the absence of 
labels is directly related to the supply conditions in the market. The greater is the 
global rate of adoption of the new technology, the lower is the market demand for 
the non-labeled product (on this issue see also Giannakas and Fulton (2002) and 
Fulton and Giannakas (2004)). 
4.3  Consumption Decisions under Scenarios 3 and 4 (One country labels) 
Under Scenarios 3 and 4 there are four products in the market and the consumer 
utility becomes: 
Figure 8:  Consumption decisions under Scenario 2 
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cPUU Digm
Si
gm λ−−=    If a unit of GM product is consumed ( ) cPUUE DinlSinl 'φ−−=   If a unit of non-labeled product is consumed 
cPUU Dit
Si
t µ−−=    If a unit of conventional product is consumed 
ss PUU −=     If a unit of the substitute product is consumed 
with i∈{3,4} indicating the relevant Scenario and φφ ≠'  because ψψ ≠' . Figure 
9 graphs SigmU , ( )SinlUE , SitU , and sU  when DigmDinlDits PPPP >>>  and the 
preference parameters are such that all products enjoy positive shares of the 
market.8  
 
0
Di
gmPU −
SPU −
U U
S
Si
t UU =
'φ
nlx
C
Si
t
Si
nl U)U(E =)U(EU SinlSigm =
Di
nlPU −
Di
tPU −
λ
µ
txgmx
gmc nlc Tc
Tx
 
Figure 9:  Consumption decisions under Scenarios 3 and 4 
 
Note that the global production share of the GM product differs under 
Scenarios 3 and 4 since the country not labeling its produce is different in each 
case. For instance, when only Country 2 labels its products (Scenario 3), 3ψ  is 
given by: 
                                                 
8 Note that if the price of the non-labeled product were less than the price of the GM-labeled 
product, the Unl curve in Figure 9 would lie above the Ugm curve ∀c, and the GM product would 
be driven out of the market. 
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3
3
1
3
11
11
3
1
S
nl
S
gm
S
nl
nl
gm
nl
t
A
A
A
ww =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−= βαψ  (28) 
while when only Country 1 labels its products (Scenario 4), ψ  becomes: 
4
4
2
4
22
22
4
1
S
nl
S
gm
S
nl
nl
gm
nl
t
A
A
A
ww =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−= βαψ  (29) 
The consumer demands for the different products when only one country labels its 
produce are: 
( )( )µλψ
PP
x
Di
gm
Di
nlSi
gm −−
−=
1
 (30) 
( ) ( )( )µλψ
PP
µλψ
PP
 x
Di
gm
Di
nl
Di
nl
Di
tSi
nl −−
−−−
−=
1
 (31) 
( )µλψ
PP
µ
PP
x
Di
nl
Di
t
Di
tsSi
t −
−−−=  (32) 
The inverse form of these demands is then: 
( )[ ] SigmSinlSitsDigm λxxµλψµµxPP −−+−−=  (33) 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] SigmSinlSitsDinl xµλψµxµλψµµxPP −+−−+−−=  (34) 
Si
gm
Si
nl
Si
ts
Di
t µxµxµxPP −−−=  (35) 
The relevant expressions for the demands under Scenario 3(4) can be obtained by 
substituting 3ψ ( 4ψ ) for ψ  in equations (30)-(35). 
5.  Market Outcomes under the Different Labeling Scenarios 
In this section the market outcomes for the four scenarios are established based on 
the results derived previously. Utilizing the supply and demand expressions 
derived in the previous two sections, a simple, stylized four-region trade model is 
developed for each scenario. The equilibrium conditions determine the prices and 
quantities of the relevant products as well as the welfare of the groups involved.  
5.1  Market Outcomes under Scenario 1  
Figure 10 depicts the configuration of the world market under Scenario 1 when 
the trading sector is perfectly competitive and trading costs are normalized to 
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zero.9 In this case, two distinct supply channels provide GM and conventional 
products to consumers in the world market and the prices paid by consumers are 
equal to those received by farmers, i.e.,  
11 S
gm
D
gm PP =  (36) 
11 S
t
D
t PP =  (37) 
The market clearing condition implies that: 
111 e
gm
S
gm
S
gm xxA ==  (38) 
111 e
t
S
t
S
t xxA ==  (39) 
where 1egmx  and 
1e
tx  are the equilibrium quantities of GM and conventional 
products traded in the world market, respectively.  
Substituting the expressions for the inverse demands (equations (22) and 
(23)) and supplies (equations (10) and (11)) for the relevant parameters in 
equations (36) and (37), and solving the system of equations we get the 
equilibrium quantities in the markets for GM and conventional products as:  
      1 22
1
11
1
λλλλ
l
gm
l
t
l
gm
l
t
e
gm wg
iw
g
iw
g
hw
g
hx µµµµ −+−−++−+−−+=  (40) 
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1
1
321
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λλ
1
l
gm
l
gm
t
l
t
l
ts
e
t
w
g
iw
g
h
w
a
dw
g
i
a
cw
g
h
a
bP
a
x
µµ
µµµµµµ
−++−++
+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+++−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+++−+=
(41) 
Substituting equations (40) and (41) into the expressions for farm prices in 
equation (10) and (11), we get the equilibrium farm prices as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 21 132111*1 lgmlgmtltltegmetSgm iwhwdwwicwhbxagaxP +++−+−+++=  (42) 
321
11*1
t
l
t
l
t
e
gm
e
t
S
t dwcwbwaxaxP ++++=  (43) 
The aggregate producer welfare in Country i under Scenario 1 can be expressed 
as: ( ) ( )
        
2
1*111*1
1
e
Ti
l
ti
S
t
e
gmi
l
gmi
S
gml
i
xwPxwP −+−=Π  (44) 
                                                 
9 Note that both the trading costs and the market power of trading firms can be safely assumed 
away from our analysis since they affect the trade of both the conventional and GM products 
(whether these are labeled or not) leaving the qualitative nature of our results on the factors 
affecting the GM producing countries’ labeling decisions unaffected. For an analysis of the 
labeling decisions under an imperfectly competitive trading sector see Veyssiere (2004). 
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Figure 10:  Market outcomes under Scenario 1 
5.2  Market Outcomes under Scenario 2  
Figure 11 depicts the configuration of the world market under Scenario 2. Since 
no country labels its products in this case, there is only one supply channel and 
the market clearing condition implies that: 
222 e
nl
S
nl
S
nl xxA ==  (45) 
where 2enlx  is the equilibrium quantity of non-labeled product traded in the world 
market. Following the same procedure outlined in the previous section, the 
equilibrium quantity is given by: 
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The equilibrium price of the non-labeled product and producer welfare in Country 
i are then: 
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Figure 11:  Market outcomes under Scenario 2 
5.3  Market Outcomes under Scenarios 3 and 4 
Figure 12 depicts the case in which only Country 1 labels its products (i.e., 
Scenario 4). As shown in this Figure, this scenario involves the emergence of 
three distinct supply channels: one for the GM, one for the conventional, and one 
for the non-labeled products. The market clearing conditions imply that: 
444 e
gm
S
gm
S
gm xAx ==  (49) 
444 e
nl
S
nl
S
nl xAx ==  (50) 
444 e
t
S
t
S
t xAx ==  (51) 
Following the same procedure established previously, we derive the 
equilibrium quantities of the three products as: 
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where  ( )11 βµµβ ++= pX  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 42321111 Sgmtnltlts ArwqwwPY µλβµµβµβ −−−−+++=  and  
 ( ) 424 Sgmegm AxZ µλ −= . 
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The farm prices of the three products are then:  
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and aggregate producer welfare in Countries 1 and 2 is given by:  ( ) ( )
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Figure 12:  Market outcomes under Scenario 4 
 
Following the same process we can get the equilibrium quantities and prices 
under Scenario 3 as: 
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with  ( )221 βµµβ ++= mX  
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Aggregate producer welfare in Countries 1 and 2 then equals:  ( ) ( )
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6.  Determinants of the Nash Equilibrium in Labeling Strategies 
This section focuses on establishing the conditions under which the different 
labeling scenarios examined previously can constitute a Nash equilibrium in 
labeling strategies. After having determined the aggregate producer welfare in 
each country under the different labeling scenarios,10 we can formulate the payoff 
matrix for Countries 1 and 2, as:  
                                                 
10 As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, if the trading firms were able to exercise market 
power and were located in one of the GM producing countries, their profits would be part of the 
economic welfare of this country and should be included in the relevant payoffs depicted in Table 
2. Obviously, the greater the weight placed by the regulator on the trading firms and/or the greater 
the imperfectly competitive trading firms’ profits under a particular labeling regime, the greater 
the likelihood that this labeling regime would constitute the optimal policy response of the 
government in question.   
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TABLE 2.  Payoff matrix 
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6.1  Conditions for Scenario 1 being a Nash Equilibrium 
For Scenario 1 to be a Nash equilibrium, no player should have an incentive to 
deviate from the labeling strategy when the other country has chosen to label its 
products. For labeling to be a country’s best response to the other country’s 
decision to label its products, the following inequalities have to hold: 
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6.2  Conditions for Scenario 2 being a Nash Equilibrium 
For Scenario 2 to be a Nash equilibrium, no country should have incentive to 
adopt a labeling regime when the other country has chosen not to label its 
products. For no labeling to be a country’s best response to the other country’s 
decision to not label its products, the following inequalities have to hold: 
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6.3  Conditions for Scenario 3 being a Nash Equilibrium 
Scenario 3 will be a Nash equilibrium when the following inequalities hold: 
01
1
1
3
1 <∆⇔Π>Π lnl  (72) 
04
2
2
3
2 <∆⇔Π>Π nll  (73) 
6.4  Conditions for Scenario 4 being a Nash Equilibrium 
Finally, the conditions that result in Scenario 4 being a Nash equilibrium are: 
03
2
1
4
1 <∆⇔Π>Π nll  (74) 
02
1
2
4
2 <∆⇔Π>Π lnl  (75) 
6.5  Determinants of the Nash Equilibrium in Labeling Strategies: Discussion  
The conditions presented above indicate that the Nash equilibrium configuration 
of labeling regimes in the countries that have adopted the GM technology depends 
on the relative farm prices for the GM, the conventional, and the non-labeled 
products under the different labeling scenarios, as well as on the cost of 
production under the GM and conventional technologies. The relative farm prices 
and costs of production are affected, in turn, by (i) the distribution of consumer 
preferences and the level of consumer aversion to GM products; (ii) the size of the 
segregation and labeling costs in the two countries; (iii) the relative productive 
efficiency and the cost effectiveness of the GM technology; (iv) the market power 
of the life science companies; and (v) the strength of intellectual property rights in 
these countries.  
While it is certainly the interaction of all these parameters that determines 
whether a profile of labeling strategies will be a Nash equilibrium or not, the rest 
of this section will focus on separating the effect of each parameter on the 
potential of the different labeling scenarios to constitute a Nash equilibrium.11 In 
so doing, we are able to gain insights on the general environment in which each 
labeling configuration is likely to emerge as a Nash equilibrium.   
                                                 
11 A simple numerical example that illustrates (i) the emergence of the different labeling scenarios 
as a Nash equilibrium under the conditions identified in this paper, and (ii) the effect of the key 
parameters on ∆1, ∆2, ∆3 and ∆4 (and, thus, the effect of these parameters on the likelihood of the 
different labeling strategy profiles to constitute a Nash equilibrium) is available from the authors 
upon request. 
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Consumer aversion to GM products  
Consistent with a priori expectations, expressions 1∆  and 2∆  in equations (68) 
and (69) rise with an increase in the level of consumer aversion to GM products 
(i.e., ( ) 01 >−∂∆∂ µλ  and ( ) 02 >−∂∆∂ µλ ), indicating that the greater is the 
consumer opposition to GM products, the more likely it is that countries will find 
it optimal to label their products. Note that, in the presence of non-labeled 
products in the market (as is the case in Scenarios 2, 3 and 4), an increase in 
consumer aversion reduces the demand for these products and causes producer 
welfare to fall. When GM products are segregated and labeled as such, the rise in 
consumer aversion reduces the demand for GM products while increasing the 
demand for their conventional counterparts. When consumer aversion is high, all 
consumers prefer the conventional product, and the GM (and non-labeled) 
products are driven out of the market. The producer welfare gains from the 
increased demand for conventional products make the labeling regime appealing 
to countries when the consumer aversion is high.   
On the other hand, a low level of consumer aversion to GM products 
reduces the appeal of labels and makes a non-labeling strategy more attractive. 
The lower is the consumer aversion to GM products, the greater are 3∆  and 4∆  
(i.e., ( ) 03 <−∂∆∂ µλ  and ( ) 04 <−∂∆∂ µλ ), and the greater is the likelihood that 
countries will find it optimal to not label their products.    
Segregation and labeling costs  
It can be shown that expressions 1∆  and 2∆  fall with an increase in the 
segregation costs associated with a labeling regime indicating that the lower are 
these costs, the more likely is that countries will find it optimal to label their 
products. Thus, Scenario 1 is more likely to be a Nash equilibrium when the 
segregation and labeling costs are relatively low in both countries.  
When these costs are relatively high in both countries, the appeal of a non-
labeling strategy increases and so does the likelihood that both countries will find 
it optimal to not label their products. Formally, the greater are the segregation and 
labeling costs, the greater are 3∆  and 4∆  in equations (70) and (71), and the more 
likely it is that Scenario 2 will emerge as the Nash equilibrium in labeling 
regimes. 
Finally, a discrepancy in the segregation and labeling costs between the two 
countries might result in different regulatory responses to products of 
biotechnology. The greater is the difference in segregation and labeling costs 
between the two countries, the more likely it is that these countries will choose 
different labeling regimes (with the low cost country labeling its products and the 
high cost country opting for a no labeling regime).   
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Market power of the life science sector and strength of IPRs  
Both the market power by the life science sector and the strength of its IPRs affect 
the base cost of producing the GM crop, gmw . The greater is the market power of 
the life science sector and/or the stronger is the enforcement of its IPRs, the more 
expensive is the GM technology (Giannakas, 2002). It can then be shown that 1∆  
and 2∆  increase with a reduction in gmw  (i.e., 01 <∂∆∂ gmw  and 02 <∂∆∂ gmw ) 
indicating that the lower is gmw , the more likely it is for countries to find it 
optimal to label their produce.  
The reasoning is as follows. A reduction in gmw  (due to low market power 
of the life science sector and/or lax enforcement of its IPRs) increases the 
production share of the GM crop. The increased production share of the GM crop 
increases the utility discount factor associated with the consumption of the non-
labeled product (see equation (24)), and reduces the consumer demand for the 
non-labeled product under the alternative Scenarios 3 and 4. Thus, the lower is the 
market power of the life science sector and/or the weaker is the enforcement of its 
IPRs, the less appealing is the no labeling regime, and the more likely it is that 
both countries will find it optimal to label their products.  
Conversely, the greater is the market power of the life science sector and/or 
the stronger is the enforcement of IPRs, the less appealing is labeling, and the 
greater is the likelihood that countries will find it optimal to not label their 
products. Formally, the greater is gmw , the greater are 3∆  and 4∆ (i.e., 
03 >∂∆∂ gmw  and 04 >∂∆∂ gmw ), and the greater is the likelihood that Scenario 
2 will be a Nash equilibrium.  
It follows that differences in the market power of the life science sector 
and/or differences in the strength of IPRs between the two countries can 
rationalize the establishment of different labeling regimes. In particular, a high 
degree of market power and/or strong IPRs in Country 1(2) combined with low 
market power and/or lax enforcement of IPRs in Country 2(1) can result in 
Scenario 3(4) being a Nash equilibrium in labeling strategies.  
Cost effectiveness of the new technology  
Similar to market power of the life science sector and the strength of IPRs, the 
cost effectiveness of the new technology affects the cost of producing the GM 
crop. The more cost effective is the new technology, the greater are 1∆  and 2∆ , 
and the more likely it is that Scenario 1 will emerge as a Nash equilibrium in 
labeling strategies. The reasoning is as follows. The greater is the cost 
effectiveness of the GM technology, the greater is the production share of GM 
products, the lower is the consumer demand for non-labeled products, and the 
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lower is the producer welfare under a no-labeling regime. Thus, the more 
effective is the new technology in reducing the costs of production, the more 
likely it is that countries that have adopted the GM technology will find it optimal 
to label their products.  
It follows that a low cost effectiveness of the GM technology in both 
countries, enhances the desirability of the no labeling regime and makes the 
emergence of Scenario 2 as a Nash equilibrium more likely. On the other hand, an 
asymmetric effect of the GM technology on the cost of production might result in 
different labeling strategies in the two countries. In such a case, the country for 
which the new technology is highly cost effective will label its products while the 
country enjoying relatively small gains from the GM technology will opt for a no 
labeling regime. Thus, a high cost effectiveness of the GM technology in Country 
1(2) combined with a low cost effectiveness in Country 2(1) can result in 
Scenario 4(3) being a Nash equilibrium. 
Table 3 summarizes the conditions facilitating the different Nash equilibria 
in labeling strategies considered in this study. It is important to point out that the 
conditions presented in Table 3 represent depictions of the general environment in 
which different configurations of labeling strategies are likely to constitute a Nash 
equilibrium. Since it is the interaction of all these factors that determine whether a 
profile of labeling strategies will be a Nash equilibrium or not, the conditions 
presented in Table 3 should be viewed as sufficient, and not as necessary, 
conditions for the different labeling scenarios to constitute a Nash equilibrium.   
It is possible, for instance, that a low cost effectiveness of the GM 
technology will be present in an environment in which both countries label their 
products. This could occur when the impact of a high consumer aversion and/or 
low segregation costs and/or low market power of the life science sector and/or 
lax IPR enforcement outweigh the impact of low cost effectiveness making 
labeling the optimal regulatory response in both regions. 
Before concluding this section it is interesting to note that while our analysis 
assumes that the countries’ objective is to maximize domestic producer welfare, 
the results summarized in Table 3 are more general and apply to cases where the 
producing countries seek to maximize their share of the world market, i.e., the 
conditions that maximize domestic producer welfare can be shown to maximize 
the market shares of the producing regions.  
Finally, it should be mentioned that the determinants of the optimal labeling 
policy of the GM producing countries (and, therefore, the determinants of the 
Nash equilibrium in labeling strategies) identified in this study are the same no 
matter if domestic consumer welfare is a direct argument in countries’ objective 
function or not. The reason is that the conditions that make labeling (no labeling) 
the optimal strategy for the GM producing regions are exactly those that result in 
labeling (no labeling) being the regime that maximizes aggregate consumer 
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welfare. As shown by Giannakas and Fulton (2002), consumers as a group are 
better off under a labeling (no labeling) regime when their aversion to GM 
products is high (low), segregation costs are low (high), and the adoption of the 
GM technology is high (low). Recall that adoption of the GM technology is high 
(low) under high (low) cost effectiveness of this technology, low (high) market 
power of the innovating firms, and weak (strong) IPRs.  
 
TABLE 3.  Conditions facilitating the different Nash equilibria 
Country 2  
Labeling No Labeling 
L
ab
el
in
g 
Scenario 1 
-  High consumer aversion to GM 
products  
-  Low segregation costs   
-  Low degree of market power 
by the life science sector 
-  Weak IPRs  
-  High cost effectiveness of GM 
technology  
 
Scenario 4 
-  Low segregation costs in C.1 & 
High segregation costs in C.2 
-  Low degree of market power by  
the life science sector in C.1 & 
High market power in C.2 
-  Weak IPRs in C.1 & Strong 
IPRs  in C.2  
-  High cost effectiveness of GM 
technology in C.1 & Low cost 
effectiveness in C.2 
C
ou
nt
ry
 1
 
N
o 
L
ab
el
in
g 
Scenario 3 
-  High segregation costs in C.1 
& Low segregation costs in C.2
-  High degree of market power 
by the life science sector in C.1 
& Low market power in C.2 
-  Strong IPRs in C.1 & Weak 
IPRs in C.2 
-  Low cost effectiveness of GM 
technology in C.1 & High cost 
effectiveness in C.2 
Scenario 2 
-  Low consumer aversion to GM 
products  
-  High segregation costs   
-  High degree of market power by 
the life science sector 
-  Strong IPRs  
-  Low cost effectiveness of GM 
technology  
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7.  Conclusions 
This paper develops a stylized four-region model of heterogeneous producers and 
consumers to analyze the strategic interdependence between a small number of 
large producing countries that have adopted the GM technology and seek to 
determine their regulatory response to products of biotechnology (i.e., whether to 
label their GM and conventional produce or not). The framework of analysis 
developed in this study builds on the research by Giannakas and Fulton (2002) 
and Fulton and Giannakas (2004) that examines market and welfare effects of the 
GM technology, by placing the analysis of labeling decisions in a multi-country 
context. To our knowledge, the effect of strategic interdependence on countries’ 
labeling decisions has not been considered previously.  
The strategic interaction between the GM producing countries is modeled in 
this paper as a strategic game where the countries determine their labeling 
regimes non-cooperatively (i.e., independently but aware that their labeling 
strategies affect each other’s payoffs). In this context, the paper examines the 
strategic effects of labeling decisions and identifies the determinants of the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium labeling regimes in these GM producing countries. 
In doing so, we are able to determine the environment in which each labeling 
configuration is likely to emerge as a Nash equilibrium i.e., the conditions under 
which the different configurations of labeling strategies can constitute a Nash 
equilibrium.  
Analytical results show that the Nash equilibrium configuration of labeling 
regimes in countries that have adopted the GM technology depends on (i) the 
distribution of consumer preferences and the level of consumer aversion to GM 
products; (ii) the size of the segregation and labeling costs in these countries; (iii) 
the relative productive efficiency and the cost effectiveness of the GM 
technology; (iv) the market power of the life science companies; and (v) the 
strength of intellectual property rights in these countries. 
Specifically, the greater (lower) is the consumer aversion to GM products 
and/or the smaller (greater) is the size of the segregation costs associated with a 
labeling regime in these countries and/or the greater (smaller) is the cost 
effectiveness of the new technology and/or the lower (greater) is the market 
power of the life science sector and/or the weaker (stronger) are the intellectual 
property rights in these countries, the more likely it is that GM producing 
countries will find it optimal to label (not label) their products.  
While a similarity in these market and agronomic characteristics leads to 
uniform labeling standards in the GM producing regions, a divergence in the 
segregation costs, productive efficiency, cost effectiveness of the GM technology, 
market power and/or enforcement of IPRs between the different countries can 
lead to different regulatory responses to products of biotechnology. Different 
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market and/or agronomic characteristics can, therefore, provide an explanation for 
the different approaches to labeling adopted in different countries around the 
world. 
In addition to providing insights on the factors affecting countries’ decisions 
on the regulation and labeling of products of biotechnology, the stylized 
framework of analysis developed in this paper can provide the basis for the 
economic analysis of important issues like the recent introduction of mandatory 
labeling by the EU and Brazil’s formal entry into the market(s) for GM crops. 
Interesting extensions of this research could also include the explicit consideration 
of the optimal regulatory response by the rest of the world and the identification 
of the conditions that could lead in the worldwide adoption of biotechnology 
and/or the labeling of GM products.   
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Glossary  
 A: producers’ differentiating attribute  
l
gmiA : total quantity of GM-labeled products supplied by Country i ( { },2,1∈i ) 
nl
gmiA : total quantity of non-labeled GM products supplied by Country i  
Sj
gmA : quantity of GM-labeled products supplied under Scenario j ( { }4,3,2,1∈j ) 
nl
nliA : total quantity of non-labeled products supplied by Country i  
Sj
nlA : quantity of non-labeled products supplied under Scenario j 
l
tiA : total quantity of conventional-labeled products supplied by Country i 
nl
tiA : total quantity of non-labeled conventional products supplied by Country i 
Sj
tA : quantity of conventional-labeled products supplied under Scenario j 
l
TiA : total quantity of labeled products supplied by Country i  
 c: consumers’ differentiating attribute  
j
gmD : total demand for GM-labeled products under Scenario j 
j
nlD : total demand for non-labeled products under Scenario j 
j
tD : total demand for conventional-labeled products under Scenario j ( )SjnlUE : expected utility associated with the consumption of non-labeled product 
under Scenario j 
Dj
gmP : per unit retail price of GM-labeled products under Scenario j 
S
gmP  : per unit farm price of GM-labeled products  
Sj
gmP : per unit farm price of GM-labeled products under Scenario j 
*Sj
gmP : equilibrium farm price of GM-labeled products under Scenario j 
Dj
nlP : per unit retail price of non-labeled products under Scenario j 
S
nlP  : per unit farm price of non-labeled products 
Sj
nlP : per unit farm price of non-labeled products under Scenario j 
*Sj
nlP : equilibrium farm price of non-labeled products under Scenario j 
sP : per unit retail price of the substitute product 
Dj
tP : per unit retail price of conventional-labeled products under Scenario j 
S
tP : per unit farm price of conventional-labeled products  
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Sj
tP : per unit farm price of conventional-labeled products under Scenario j 
*Sj
tP : equilibrium farm price of conventional-labeled products under Scenario j 
j
gmS : total supply of GM-labeled products under Scenario j 
j
gmiS : supply of GM-labeled products by Country i under Scenario j  
j
nlS 3 : supply of non-labeled products by the R.O.W. under Scenario j 
j
nlS : total supply of non-labeled products under Scenario j  
j
nliS : supply of non-labeled products by Country i under Scenario j 
j
tS 3 : supply of conventional-labeled products by the R.O.W. under Scenario j 
j
tS : total supply of conventional-labeled products under Scenario j 
j
tiS : supply of conventional-labeled products by Country i under Scenario j 
 U : per unit base level of utility associated with the consumption of a product  
Sj
gmU : per unit utility associated with the consumption of GM-labeled product 
under Scenario j 
Sj
tU : per unit utility associated with the consumption of conventional-labeled 
product under Scenario j 
sU : per unit utility associated with the consumption of a substitute product 
l
gmiw : per unit base cost associated with the production of GM-labeled products in 
Country i 
lj
gmiw : per unit base cost associated with the production of GM-labeled products in 
Country i under Scenario j 
nl
gmiw : per unit base cost associated with the production of non-labeled GM 
product in Country i 
l
tiw : per unit base cost associated with the production of conventional-labeled 
products in Country i 
nl
tiw : per unit base cost associated with the production of non-labeled conventional 
products in Country i 
ej
gmx : equilibrium quantity of GM-labeled products traded under Scenario j 
ej
gmix : equilibrium quantity of GM-labeled products by Country i traded under 
Scenario j 
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Sj
gmx : quantity of GM-labeled products demanded under Scenario j 
ej
nlx 3 : equilibrium quantity of non-labeled products by the R.O.W. traded under 
Scenario j 
ej
nlx : equilibrium quantity of non-labeled products traded under Scenario j 
ej
nlix : equilibrium quantity of non-labeled products by Country i traded under 
Scenario j 
Sj
nlx : quantity of non-labeled products demanded under Scenario j 
ej
tx 3 : equilibrium quantity of conventional-labeled products by the R.O.W. traded 
under Scenario j 
ej
tx : equilibrium quantity of conventional-labeled products traded under Scenario j 
ej
tix : equilibrium quantity of conventional-labeled products by Country i traded 
under Scenario j 
Sj
tx : quantity of conventional-labeled products demanded under Scenario j 
Sj
Tx : total quantity of labeled products demanded under Scenario j 
iα : cost enhancement factor associated with the production of GM products in 
Country i 
iβ : cost enhancement factor associated with the production of conventional 
products in Country i 
λ : utility discount factor associated with the consumption of GM-labeled 
products 
µ : utility discount factor associated with the consumption of conventional-
labeled products  
aπ : per unit net return function for the alternative product 
l
gmπ : per unit net return function for GM-labeled products  
nl
gmπ : per unit net return function for non-labeled GM products 
l
tπ : per unit net return function for conventional-labeled products  
nl
tπ : per unit net return function for non-labeled conventional products 
l
iΠ : aggregate producer welfare in Country i under a labeling regime  
lj
iΠ : equilibrium aggregate producer welfare in Country i under labeling in Scenario j 
nl
iΠ : aggregate producer welfare in Country i under a no labeling regime   
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nlj
iΠ : equilibrium aggregate producer welfare in Country i under no labeling in 
Scenario j 
φ : utility discount factor associated with the consumption of non-labeled products 
gmiχ : demand conjectural variation elasticity of the life science sector in Country i 
ψ : global production share of the GM product in the total quantity of non-labeled 
products supplied  
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